The organizations of insect societies, such as division of labor, task allocation, collective regulation, mass action responses, have been considered as main reasons for the ecological success. In this article, we propose and study a general modeling framework that includes the following three features: (a) the average internal response threshold for each task (the internal factor); (b) social network communications that could lead to task switching (the environmental factor); and (c) dynamical changes of task demands (the external factor). Since workers in many social insect species exhibit age polyethism, we also extend our model to incorporate age polyethism in which worker task preferences change with age. We apply our general modeling framework to the cases of two task groups: the inside colony task versus the outside colony task. Our analytical study of the models provides important insights and predictions on the effects of colony size, social communication, and age related task preferences on task allocation and division of labor in the adaptive dynamical environment. Our study implies that the smaller size colony invests its resource for the colony growth and allocates more workers in the risky tasks such as foraging while the larger colony shifts more workers to perform the safer tasks inside the colony. Social interactions among different task groups play an important role in shaping task allocation depending on the relative cost and demands of the tasks.
Introduction
Social insects such as ants, bees, wasps and termites, among the most diverse and ecologically important organisms on earth, live in intricately governed societies that rival our own in complexity and internal cohesion [39] . They exhibit a decentralized system of task allocation (population distribution of workers performing different tasks), with a sophisticated division of labor (different workers specializing in subsets of tasks performed by a colony) resulting from interactions among members of the colony and the environment. This decentralization leads to highly complex dynamics governed by many independent individual interactions, which has advantages as compared to a hierarchical organization [15, 22, 27, 28, 55] including: scalability where the colony is able to adjust its organizational structure, including its division of labor and task allocations, as its size increases [56] ; robustness/flexibility where the colony is able to cope with environmental perturbations; and simplicity of the behavior of each individual in the colony. These properties have led to an increased interest in the dynamics and organization of social insect colonies in domains outside of biology, including network routing, optimization theory and robotics [29, 102, 115] . However, social insect biologists face the challenge of integrating between the individual and colony levels of organization [39, 132] .
Task allocation and division of labor are functionally inter-connected aspects of task organization. They are fundamental properties of biological systems across all levels of organization, from cells to societies [40, 83] and are two of the most prominent features of social insect colony behavior [92, 131, 138] . Mathematical models have begun to show colony-level patterns of task organizations that can result from simple individual behavioral rules, which provide an understanding of the underlying organizational framework on which selection can act. Classical models of colony organization have focused on the adaptive value of social structure [39, 92, 131, 136, 138] . Some recent models have focused on the mechanistic processes that generate colony organization and behavior. More recent models treat the social insect colony as a selforganized, decentralized system in which behavior emerges from the independent actions and decisions of workers. Self-organization models can be used to describe numerous colony processes, including homeostasis [13, 128] , mass action responses [8, 13, 14, 25, 26, 84] , and colony construction [8, 72] . However, modeling task organizations including division of labor and task allocations is still in an early stage.
Most mechanistic models of task organization have used a simulation approach. The majority build from the assumption that individual workers vary in their response thresholds to perform a given task [53, 1, 100, 65, 10] . Individuals with lower thresholds are more likely to become specialists for that task. Because individuals vary in thresholds, different group members specialize on different tasks, a division of labor emerges [7, 53, 100, 65, 10, 74] . Recent work of Gautrais et al [43] coupled variation in response thresholds with self-reinforcement, such that individuals performing a task reduce their thresholds for performing it again. This amplifies effects of group size on specialization. Jeanson et al. [66] generated a positive effect of group size on division of labor, from the assumption that worker availability is consistently higher than the colony's need for task performance. There is significant empirical support for these response threshold models, including demonstration that individuals have intrinsic sensory thresholds for behaviors [74, 9, 95] , that variance in thresholds influences variation in task performance [74, 9, 95] and that the diversity of individuals performing a task increases with stimulus levels [106, 107] . The self-reinforcement assumption also matches empirical data indicating that experienced workers are more likely to perform a task again, and to engage in it more quickly [68, 4] . An age polyethism model developed by Wakano and coworkers [126] assumed that workers were grouped into different age classes, and each age class allocated labor in predetermined proportions for inside (e.g., brood care) and outside (foraging) tasks. These simulations are insightful and some of their predictions have been supported by data. However, these simulation models in many cases involve many parameters that are difficult to measure from real data; and mathematically, they are too complicated to track. In addition, researchers developing models independently often target different components of the processes generating task organizations. Thus, there is a need to broaden the integrative scope of these models by using developing and studying realistic and mathematical trackable models [39] .
Differential equations provide a promising tool for analyzing the mechanisms underlying colony-level patterns and dynamics such as division of labor, task allocation, and generate testable predictions about how multiple components of colony organization interact in changing environments. These models have been successfully applied to insect societies in colony population dynamics (e.g., [69] ), colony organization (e.g., [75, 52] ), foraging (e.g., [109, 114, 124] ), colony metabolic scaling (e.g., [54] ), optimal decision-making in social insect colonies (e.g., [81] ) and social parasitism (e.g., [70] ). The power of these models lies in their simple mathematical formalism for describing how different interested components interact and change through time. In this manuscript, we will use compartmental differential equations models to develop a general framework to characterize the crucial feedback mechanisms linking social interaction, colony structure and dynamics of task organizations in a dynamical environment, and understand potential processes of task organization as colony size increases.
In our proposed modeling framework, both task allocation and division of labor are modeled around the assumptions that (1) available workers perform a task when they encounter stimulus levels that match or exceed their threshold; and (2) social interaction plays the role of information transfer in task switching decisions that can affect task allocation. The later assumption has been supported by many models and data that contact rates from individuals engaged in a task increase the likelihood of recruiting others into that task. For example, in P. californicus, relative contact rates increase with worker number and density.
In highly eusocial colonies (e.g., eusocial Hymenoptera [77, 125, 33] ), variation in worker task performance can also be generated by discrete physical castes as they age. For example, in field P. californicus colonies, younger workers are significantly less likely to perform outside tasks, including foraging and waste management, and are generally less likely to be outside the nest [44] . Thus, we also extend the model to include an age polyethism, in which workers shift tasks with age.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we derive a general modeling framework that includes genetically based variation in the stimulus levels for a task to which individual workers respond; variation in task performance on differences in individual experience of the environment, task demand (flexibility) through social network communications in the colony; and the adaptive dynamics of the demand/resource of each task in the colony. In Section 3, we provide analytical results on the proposed model to address how colony size and social interaction affect the task organization. In Section 4, we extend our model to include age polyethism, and analyze the model to explore how age polyethism affects task organization in addition to the effects of colony size and social interaction. In the last section, we discuss the biological implications of our analytical results from our proposed models, and the potential outlook of our current work.
Model derivation of task organization
In this section, we propose a general dynamical compartmental model of task organization on the colony level that incorporates (a) genetically based variation in the stimulus levels for a task to which individual workers respond (response thresholds [4] ); (b) variation in task performance on differences in individual experience of the environment, task demand (flexibility) through social network communications in the colony [4, 40] ; (c) dynamics of the demand/resource of each task in the colony. We assume the social insect colony has m ≥ 2 tasks.
The proposed model with the three components mentioned above can be represented as the following set of nonlinear compartment model:
The variable N in Model (1) represents the colony size that includes all workers performing m different tasks; T i represents the size of workers performing task i, i = 1, 2, .., m where T (t) = (T 1 (t), T 2 (t), ..., T m (t)) represents the task allocation of the colony at time t; and D i (t) is the work demand or stimulus level of task i, i = 1, 2, .., m. The parameter r denotes the reproduction rate of queen(s) of the colony; b is the saturation constant; θ i is the average response threshold of workers performing task i; and µ i is the average mortality of workers who perform task i.
Model (1) incorporates variance in response thresholds and experiences, thus division of labor and task allocation become strongly influenced by the group size N = m i=1 T i , task number m, social communications among task groups
., m, and the related task demand D i where these variables showed an interaction effect [66] . More precisely, Model (1) has the following ecological assumptions:
1. The newborn workers are determined by the reproduction ability of queen(s) measured by r and the collaborated efforts from m task groups described by N s b+N s where b is the saturation constant and s > 1 denotes that nonlinear effects of the collaboration. This modeling approach has been used for modeling leaf-cutter ants in Kang et al [69] and for population dynamics of honeybees in [34, 71, 103] .
2. The death rate of task group i, denoted by µ i , should be a nonlinear function of the size of task group i and the total colony size N . For simplicity, we assume µ i is a constant and measures that average mortality of workers performing task i.
3. The demand of task i of the colony, denoted by D i , is determined by the following two factors: (1) The demand γ i N is an increasing function of the colony size where γ i represents the increase in demand intensity per unit time for task i. (2) The depletion of demand α i T i D i is an increasing function of the demand D i and the size of task group T i where α i denotes the average performance efficiency of the task group i. This modeling approach is adopted from Theraulaz et al [116] .
4. The population size of task group i is determined by the following two factors in addition to its natural mortality rate µ i :
• The relative competition ability of task group i is measured by
is the competition ability of task group k. The term
describes that the higher demand D k and the lower response threshold θ k of task k provide the higher competition ability of workers in task group k, therefore, as a consequence, T k is expected to have a higher recruitment rate of new workers.
• The task switching rate between task groups is determined by their relative competition ability of task group and the task allocation at time t, i.e.:
The rate of worker in task group i switching to other task group j( = i):
the relative competition ability of task group j where
describes the probability of workers performing task i switching to task group j.
Therefore, the social network communication matrix {f The proposed general model (1) incorporates both variation in task performance among workers and individual worker flexibility. The decision of an individual worker performing a task depends on both the internal factors (e.g., the varied thresholds for different tasks) and the external factors (e.g., task needs from the environment, or worker-worker interactions that communicate task needs). Thus, the dynamical outcomes of Model (1) are expected to predict how colonies allocate workers in relation to the need for each task and adjust the allocation in response to environmental changes through the social network communication matrix {f 
First, we have the following lemma: 
Define Condition H as follows:
. Now we have our first theorem regarding the model (2) as follows: 
If N (0) < N − 1 , then we have lim inf t→∞ N (t) = 0.
Notes: Theorem 3.1 suggests that our model (2) is well defined biologically, and the allocation of task i and its related demand D i are persistent under condition that the colony is established successfully, i.e., the colony size N is also persistent provided that Condition H is satisfied. 
which give the follows
Therefore, we are able to solve the task allocation X = (x 1 , .., x m ) from the following equations
which allow us to solve D and N from D i = γi αixi and
θiαi as a measure of a relative demand of task i, then the discussion above gives the following lemma: 
Notes: The solution X of (6) determines by two parts: social interactions and the recruitment rate from the relative competitive ability, i.e., the equation
could be represented as follows:
The modeling framework of the model (2) allows us investigate the following two scenarios:
1. How the size of a colony N affects the task allocation X. Since we assume that µ m = max 1<i<m {µ i } and µ 1 = min 1<i<m {µ i } , then According to Lemma 3.2, we know that
If we assume that the time scale of the population dynamics of N is much slower than the time scale of the task allocation x i and the dynamics of demand D i , then we could let the total population N * be a constant when we investigate the task allocation X at a faster time scale. According to (7), we can see that for a fixed population N * , the value of Φ(N * ) could be increasing or decreasing with respect to x * i depending on its corresponding mortality. We will come back to this topic when we apply our model to a two-task situation in the following subsection.
2. How social antennation interactions among task groups, i.e., the social network communication matrix {f
, affects the task allocation X. To investigate this, we will compare the task allocation X of the model (2) to the case when there is no such effects which is the following model:
whose task allocation X * follows the following equation based on the similar discussions from Lemma 3.2:
3.1. Application to the two task groups: the outside colony task versus the inside colony task
To continue our study, we focus on the case when s = 2 and m = 2, i.e., two tasks groups (the outside colony task versus the inside colony task). It is nature to assume that the mortality of the outside colony task µ 2 such as foraging is larger than the inside colony task µ 1 such as brood care. Then x 1 is the task allocation for the inside colony task. This gives x 2 = 1 − x 1 which is the task allocation for the outside colony task.
According to Lemma 3.2 (also see equations (3), (4), and (5)), we have the following equations of the interior equilibrium (N, X, D) of Model (2) when s = 2 and m = 2:
,
which gives
Now we have the following theorem: 
where
, and x * 1 ∈ (0, 1) which is the positive root of (10). Moreover, the following statements hold:
is unstable, and the population N * ± are in the following intervals:
In addition, N * + is an increasing function of x * 1 , while it is a decreasing function of
, respectively.
2. The allocation of the inside colony task x * 1 is greater than the critical valuex 1 wherê
3. The allocation of the inside colony task x * 1 is increasing with respect toD
, µ 2 , respectively, and x * 1 is decreasing with respect to its average mortality rate µ 1 . where, biologically, the smaller population size N (e.g., N ∈ (N * − , N c )) indicates that the colony is at the early ergonomic growth stage which is highly unstable (see Kang et al [69] and Clark and Fewell [20] ). When the colony size is larger than the threshold N c , then the colony size approaches to the matured size
2 . According to Theorem 3.2, N * + is decreasing with respect to the allocation of the outside colony task x * 2 and is increasing with respect to the allocation of the inside colony task x * 1 . This result suggests that the matured colony distributes more allocation to the inside colony task distribution x * 1 (e.g., invests more in less risky task) as its size increases. Theorem 3.2 also implies that the average mortality and the related colony demand can have huge influences on a social insect colony size since the population size of the matured colony is decreasing with respect to the mortality of the inside colony task µ 1 and the relative demand of the inside colony taskD 2
D1
. More detailed discussion on the effects of the colony size will be presented in the next subsection.
In the case that Condition H does not hold, the model (2) and
µ1−µ2 where x * 1 is the unique positive root of the equation (10) . In the case that x * 1 < x c In addition, Theorem 3.2 provides insights on how the relative demand and the mortality of tasks would affect the task allocation. The theorem implies that the inside colony task allocation x * 1 should be above a
which is determined by its task mortality µ 1 and the relative task demandD 2
. The thresholdx 1 is decreasing with respect toD 2
and µ 1 , respectively. This suggests that increasing the values ofD 2
or µ 1 could potentially decrease the inside task allocation x * 1 as the task allocation is closely regulated by the colony demand and its mortality. This confirms our second results of Theorem 3.2, i.e., the allocation of the inside colony task x * 1 is increasing with respect toD 1
D2
, µ 2 , respectively, however x * 1 is decreasing with respect to µ 1 . These analytical results could have the following profound biological implications:
1. When the value ofD 2 D1 increases, this implies that the colony has higher demand of the outside task such as foraging, thus the colony would distribute more workers to the outside colony task x * 2 = 1 − x * 1 despite that this task has a higher mortality. The consequence is that the colony would decrease the allocation to the inside colony task x * 1 2. When the value of the average mortality rate of the inside colony task µ 1 increases, the colony experiences more cost to distribute workers to this task. To optimize the investment of the colony, the colony would decrease the distribution to the inside colony task.
3. When the value of the average mortality rate of the outside colony task µ 2 increases, the colony experiences more cost to distribute workers to the outside colony task, thus the colony will increase the worker distribution to the inside colony task to optimize the energy investment.
Effects of the colony size N
In the previous subsection, under the assumption that population dynamics N occur at the comparable time scale of the task allocation, the results of Theorem 3.2 provide important insights on the relationship between the long-term task allocation dynamics and the long-term population dynamics when the colony is matured (i.e., the population is above certain threshold). In this subsection, we assume that the time scale of the population dynamics of N is much slower than the time scale of the task allocation x i and the dynamics of the demand D i . Thus, we could let the total population N be a constant. According to (7), we can conclude that the task allocation X * satisfies the following equations:
Notice that there exists a threshold N c = √ b, such that Φ(N ) = rN b+N 2 is increasing with respect to N if N < N c while it is decreasing if N > N c . For a given population size N * such that the condition µ 1 < Φ(N * ) < µ 2 holds, then we have the following equalities:
which indicates that ∂x * 1
Recall that x * 1 is the allocation of the inside colony task such as brood care with the smaller mortality rate and x * 2 is the allocation of the outside colony task such as foraging with the larger mortality rate. We can conclude that the colony size has important effects on the task allocation. There exists a threshold size N c = √ b: when the colony size is below this threshold, the allocation of the outside colony task such as foraging increases with the colony size. However, if the colony size is above this threshold, the allocation of the outside colony task decreases with the colony size. From biological point of view, we could consider this threshold N c is a population size that determines the stage of the colony:
1. If the colony size is less than this threshold, i.e., N < N c , the colony is at the early ergonomic growth stage where the colony invests its resource for the colony growth. Thus, the colony requires more workers to perform the outside colony task such as foraging to support the growth need of the colony.
2. If the colony size is larger than this threshold, i.e., N > N c , the colony is at the matured stage where the colony invests its resource for the mantainence of the colony. During this stage, the colony shits workers that perform the outside colony task to perform the safer task, i.e., the inside colony task, such as brood care to take care new queens and drone. Thus, the allocation of the outside colony task is expected to be decreasing with respect the colony size.
Our analytical results are supported by empirical findings. For example, in colonies of the common black garden ant, Lasius niger, reduced the proportion of the colony that foraged as colony size increased [50] . In harvest ant colonies, it is found that larger colonies increased allocation to less risky activities such as trash removal instead of more risky task such as foraging [58] . When honey bee colonies were manipulated to reduce worker numbers, they immediately increased pollen collection (foraging food for brood), and increased the number of brood being reared [110] .
Effects of social interactions among task groups
Assume that social interactions (such as antennation in ants) among task groups {f T ij } m i,j=1 do not contribute to the task allocation (i.e., the model (8)), then the task allocation X * when s = m = 2 satisfies the following equation according to (9) and (10):
The task allocation x * 1 of Model (8) without social communications can be described as the following lemma: Lemma 3.3 (Task allocation without the contribution of social antennation interactions ). Let s = m = 2, µ 1 < µ 2 , and assume that Condition H holds. Then the model (8) has a unique task allocation
Moreover, the following statements hold:
holds, then the allocation of the inside task x * 1 of the model (8) is smaller than its allocation of the outside task x * 2 .
If
µ1 µ2 <D 1 D2 holds, then the allocation of the inside task x * 1 of the model (8) is larger than its allocation of the outside task x * 2 . Notes: The proof of Lemma 3.3 can be obtained through solving x * 1 from the following equation: [1 − x 1 ] 2 = µ1D2 µ2D1 x 2 1 . Lemma 3.3 implies that if social interactions do not contribute to the task allocation, then the task allocation is totally determined by the ratio of the relative mortality µ1 µ2 to the relative task demandD 1
D2
, i.e., the inside colony task allocation is
. This ratio could be considered as the relative cost of the inside colony task, thus the larger the ratio, the smaller allocation to the inside colony task.
How social interactions regulate the task allocation: If social interactions do contribute to the task allocation, i.e., the full model (2), then the allocation of the inside colony task x * 1 is determined by the equation (10), i.e.,
where the contribution of social interactions to the task allocation follows the following expression:
which implies that
; SI(x 1 ) < 0 when
as the inside colony task allocation of the task organization model (8) that has no contribution from social interactions;
as a threshold determining the effects from social interactions SI(x 1 ); and x R 1 as the inside colony task allocation of the task organization model (2) that has contributions from social interactions. Then we have the following theorem regarding the effects of social interactions to the task allocation: Notes: Theorem 3.3 implies that the effect of social interactions is determined by
If
which is the ratio of the product of the mortality and the relative demand of the inside colony task to the product of the mortality and the relative demand of the inside colony task:
If the ratio µ1D1 µ2D2
is greater than 1, i.e. , then social interactions would regulate the outside colony workers back to the colony to perform the inside colony task. Note that µ 1 < µ 2 , thus we have the relative demand of the outside colony task is less than the inside colony task,D 2 D1 < 1. Therefore, social interactions among workers could rearrange more workers for the inside colony task to satisfy its demand.
is less than 1, i.e. 
D1
, then social interactions would regulate more workers to perform the outside colony task due to the large relative demandD 2 D1 of the outside colony task.
The task organization model with temporal polyethism
Temporal polyethism is ubiquitous among eusocial insect colonies [132] . It is a mechanism of task allocation where tasks in a colony are allocated among workers based on their age. In general, newly emerged workers perform less ricky tasks within the nest, such as brood care and nest maintenance, and progress to more risky tasks outside the nest, such as foraging, nest defense, and corpse removal as they age. For example, in honeybees, the youngest workers (from about 1-3 days) exclusively clean cells. From about 3-11 days, workers perform tasks related to brood care and nest maintenance. From 11-20 days, they transition to receiving and storing food from foragers, and at about 20 days workers begin to forage [108] . Similar temporal polyethism patterns can be seen in primitive species of wasps and many species of ants where young workers feed larvae, and then transition to nest building tasks, followed by foraging [89, 59] . However, this pattern is not rigid. Workers of certain ages have strong tendencies to perform certain tasks, but may switch to other tasks through social interactions when the stimulus of other tasks are high. For instance, removing young workers from the nest of the ant Pheidole dentata will cause foragers, especially younger foragers, to revert to tasks such as caring for brood [86] There are limited mathematical models on task organizations of social insect colonies with temporal polyethism (but see [126] ). In this section, we extend the model (1) to the following model (14) to incorporate temporal polyethism:
The modeling assumptions are similar to the model (1) introduced in Section 2, except that we assume that newborn workers are born in the task status i = 1, e.g, brood care, with the rate rN 2 b+N 2 while the population size of the task group i ≥ 2 is determined by the maturation rate β i−1i from the task group i − 1 to the task group i. Let x i = Ti N , the model (14) can be rewritten as follows:
DefineD i = γi αiθi , then we have the following theorem: Theorem 4.1 (Basic dynamical properties with age structure related DOL). Assume that all parameters are strictly positive and Condition H holds. Then the model (15) is positively invariant and bounded in Ω. More specifically, we have 
Notes: The proof of Theorem 4.1 is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.2, thus we omit the details. In the case that social interactions do not contribute to the task organization, then Model (15) is reduced to the following one:
whose equilibrium (N * , X * , D * ) satisfies the following equations: 
In the following section, we focus on the case when s = 2 and m = 2.
Application to the allocation of the outside colony task and the inside colony task
In the rest of the section, we focus on the case when s = 2 and m = 2, i.e., two tasks groups (the outside colony task versus the inside colony task). Without loss of generality, we let x 1 be the task allocation for the inside colony task such as brood care. This gives x 2 = 1 − x 1 which is the task allocation for the outside colony task such as foraging. In general, the younger workers perform the inside colony task that has a lower mortality rate that the older workers who perform the outside colony task due to predation, whether, etc. It is natural to assume that µ 1 < µ 2 .
For s = 2, m = 2, then according to Theorem 4.1, the task allocation for the inside colony task x * 1 satisfies the following equations:
which gives the following equation:
Recall that the task allocation x * 1 of the model without age structure (2) satisfies the following equation:
This implies follows the task allocation of Model (15) does not depend on the mortality of the inside colony task µ 1 , instead, the maturation rate β 1,2 from the inside colony task group to the outside colony task group, the mortality of the outside colony task µ 2 , and the relative demand of the outside colony taskD 
, and x * 1 ∈ (0, 1) which is the positive root of (20) . Moreover, the following statements hold:
1. The equilibrium (N * − , X * , D * ) is unstable, the total population N * ± are in the following intervals:
In addition, N * + is an increasing function of x * 1 , while it is a decreasing function of x * 2 , β 1,2 , µ 1 , respectively.
If β
, then the allocation of the inside colony task x * 1 is greater than the critical valuex 1
∈ (0, 1) with
3. The allocation of the inside colony task x * 1 is decreasing with respect to β 1,2 . If
, then x * 1 is increasing with respect to µ 2 .
Notes:
The maturation rate β 1,2 from the inside colony task group to the outside colony task group could be considered as the additional "death" rate of the inside colony task group and the birth rate of the outside colony task group. Theorem 4.2 implies that the relative small value of β 1,2 (e.g., β 1,2 < 1 + µ2D2 D1
) can guarantee the inside task allocation x * 1 above some thresholdx 1 , however, if β 1,2 is too large, then the inside task allocation x * 1 would be very small since it is decreasing with respect to β 1,2 . These theoretical results suggest that the timing of worker maturation may be important in shaping various aspects of task organizations. For example, the empirical study of honey bees by Giray et al [45] support that faster individual behavioral development may result in a larger force of foragers and a smaller force of nurse. In addition, Theorem 4.2 indicates that when the maturation rate β 1,2 is large, then increasing the average mortality of the outside colony task can increase the inside colony task allocation. Its biological implication is that the colony will regulate the outside colony workers back to the colony to perform less risky work when the cost of the outside colony task is too high.
Effects of the colony size N : Similar to our discussion provided in Section 3.1 and 3.2, the matured colony (i.e., the size is above a threshold) distributes more allocation to the inside colony task distribution x * 1 (e.g., invests more in less risky task) as its size increases, while the early stage colony (i.e., the size is below a threshold) allocate more force to the outside colony task distribution x * 2 for growth. In addition, the matured colony is decreasing with respect to the mortality of the inside colony task µ 1 and the maturation rate β 1,2 .
Effects of social interactions among task groups
Assume that social interactions (such as antennation in ants) among task groups {f T ij } m i,j=1 do not contribute to the task allocation (i.e., the model (17)), then the task allocation X * = (x *
which satisfies the following equation according to Lemma 4.1
.
If social interactions do contribute to the task allocation, i.e., the full model (15) , then the allocation of the inside colony task x * 1 is determined by the equation (20), i.e.,
where the contribution of social interactions to the task allocation follows the equation (13).
β1,2µ2 as the inside colony task allocation of the task organization model (17) that has no contribution from social interactions;
as a threshold determining the effects from social interactions SI(x 1 ) (13); and x RA 1 as the inside colony task allocation of the task organization model (15) that has contributions from social interactions. Then we have the following corollary regarding the effects of social interactions to the task allocation by applying the proof of Theorem 3.3: 1. For Model (17) , the ratio of the inside colony task allocation to the outside colony task allocation is µ2 β1,2 . Effects of social interactions among task groups: Corollary 4.1 implies that, in the absence of the contribution of social interactions to task allocation, the task allocation is completely determined by the mortality of the outside colony task µ 2 and the maturation rate (or the birth rate of the outside colony task group) β 1,2 where the mortality of the inside colony task µ 1 and the task demand have no effects.
If
We can denote β1,2 µ2 as the relative population of the outside colony task group which the ratio of the birth rate of the outside colony task group to its mortality; andD 2
D1
as the relative task demand of the outside colony task. Corollary 4.1 indicates that if the relative population is less than that the relative demand of the outside colony task group, then social interactions will regulate outside colony workers back to colony to perform the inside colony task to satisfy the demand. However, if the relative population is more than that the relative demand of the outside colony task group, then social interactions will regulate more workers to perform outside colony tasks to optimize its investment.
Discussion
Evidence of the ecological success of social insects can be found almost everywhere [137] . The organizations of insect societies, such as, division of labor, task allocation, collective regulation, mass action responses, have been considered as main reasons for the success [94] . Colony-level patterns including the sizes of task groups, the patterns of overlap among task groups [133] , and short-term task allocation [46] , emerge from the decisions and actions of individual workers. Increasing evidence suggests that although genetic, physiological and other aspects must be taken into account [76, 90, 96] , mechanistic explanations should be studied together [11, 41, 115] . In this article, we develop a framework of mathematical models to explore the crucial feedback mechanisms linking both structure and dynamics of task organizations in a dynamical environment, and investigate the potential underlying processes of task organization as colony size increases.
Task allocation is assessed by the distribution of number of workers across tasks [57, 58, 134] . Social insect colonies can rapidly change its task allocation between tasks in response to changes in task need and/or environment stimuli [39, 91, 50, 122] , which has been driven in part by the colony's social communications, and the high connectivity of workers across task groups [66, 135] . Depending on the species the tasks typically include collecting food (forager), feeding and caring for the offspring (broodcare), and defending the nest against intruders or parasites (soldier). There is an extensive body of empirical work in biology studying the phenomenon of division of labor in social insect colonies (e.g., [16, 110, 30, 31, 99] ), and the related individual behaviors that could generate the collective division of labor (e.g., [3, 114, 88] ). These empirical work suggested that workers might select and potentially switch tasks based on different features, including their age [106, 111] , social communications with other ants [106, 112, 49] , or the internal response thresholds and the task demands [5, 104] . Our proposed models include these important features.
More precisely, our first general model incorporates three features: (a) the average internal response threshold for each task (the internal factor); (b) social network communications that could lead to task switching (the environmental factor); and (c) dynamical changes of task demands (the external factor). Workers in many social insect species exhibit age polyethism, in which worker task preferences change with age. It is well-known that age polyethism could constrain the ability of individuals to switch immediately between tasks. For example, P. californicus workers have a general age transition from in-nest tasks, such as brood care, to external tasks, including foraging and waste management [113, 61, 20] . In order to understand how age polyethism affect task organization such as division of labor and task allocation in addition to the three features mentioned earlier, we develop an additional general model with age polyethism that is modified from the first model. The proposed models are biologically well-defined (see Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1). We apply our general modeling framework to the cases of the inside colony task versus the outside colony task. Our analytical study of the models provide important insights on the effects of colony size, social communication, and age related task preferences on task allocation and division of labor.
When the population growth dynamics of a colony occurs at the comparable time scale of the task allocation, our theoretical results (Theorem 3.2) show that the relative demand and the mortality of tasks would affect the task allocation in the following way: (1) The inside colony task allocation is above a threshold that is determined by its mortality and the relative demand. (2) When the colony has higher demand of the outside task such as foraging, the colony would distribute more workers to the outside colony task despite that this task has a higher mortality. (3) To optimize the investment of the colony, the colony would decrease the distribution to a colony task when its mortality increases. For social insect colonies with age polyethism, our results (Theorem 4.2) indicate that the maturation time of workers play an important role in shaping various aspects of task organizations. If the maturation rate is large, then increasing the average mortality of the outside colony task can increase the inside colony task allocation. Its biological implication is that the colony will regulate the outside colony workers back to the colony to perform less risky work when the cost of the outside colony task is too high.
When the time scale of the population growth dynamics is much slower than the task allocation and the related demand (i.e., the colony size can be considered as constant when study the dynamics of task allocation), the colony size has a huge impact on the task allocations. Our analysis implies that: When the colony is at the early ergonomic growth stage (i.e., its size is below a threshold), the colony invests its resource for the colony growth. As a consequence, the colony requires more workers to perform the outside colony task such as foraging to support the growth need of the colony. When the colony is at the matured stage (i.e., its size is above a threshold), the colony shifts more workers to perform the safer task (e.g., the inside colony task). As a consequence, the allocation of the outside colony task decreases with respect the colony size. For colonies with age polyethism, the size of the matured colony decreases when the mortality of the inside colony task (or the maturation rate of the outside colony task) increases.
Our theoretical findings are supported by empirical studies that have showed that the social context, in particular colony size, influences the ergonomics of insect societies. For instance, colony size shapes the exploratory and foraging responses in ants, and an increase in worker number triggers the formation of more efficient foraging networks [3] . In wasps, the delay experienced by workers during transfer of materials for nest construction decreases with group size due to the reduction of stochastic fluctuations [2] . Increased colony size can also affect the rate of interactions among workers and thus contribute significantly to the efficient allocation of individuals to different tasks [93, 89] . For the harvester ant (Pogonomyrmex badius), in spring, proportion foraging increased due to an increase in forager number and reduction in colony size, and in late summer, it decreased as colony size increased through new worker birth and a loss of about 3 % of foragers per day [78] . Moreover, immature colonies (less than 800 workers) reached a higher maximum proportion foraging than large, mature colonies each year [78] .
Social communication in social insect colonies has profound impacts on the organization of task allocation and division of labor [17, 39, 50] . Empirical work show that direct physical contacts (e.g., antennations) can generate changes in the number of workers performing a task [47, 48, 93, 98] , and almost all work activities, from task switching to recruitment, to assessment of task needs, require workers to interact with others. Our analysis (Lemma 3.3) reveals that without the contribution from social interactions, the task allocation is totally determined by the ratio of the relative mortality to the relative task demand. This ratio could be considered as the relative cost of the task, thus the larger the ratio, the smaller allocation to the task. In the presence of the social interaction, our results (Theorem 3.3) imply that the effect of social interactions is determined by the ratio of the product of the mortality and the relative demand of the inside colony task to the product of the mortality and the relative demand of the inside colony task. If the ratio is greater than 1, then social interactions would regulate the outside colony workers back to the colony to perform the inside colony task. However, if the ratio is less than 1, then social interactions would regulate more workers to perform the outside colony task due to the large relative demand of the outside colony task.
For the model with temporal polyethism, our work (Corollary 4.1) implies that, in the absence of the contribution of social interactions, the task allocation is completely determined by the mortality of the outside colony task and the maturation rate (or the birth rate of the outside colony task group) where the mortality of the inside colony task and the task demand have no effects. With the contribution of social interaction, our analysis indicates that if the relative population is less than that the relative demand of the outside colony task group, then social interactions will regulate outside colony workers back to colony to perform the inside colony task to satisfy the demand. However, if the relative population is more than that the relative demand of the outside colony task group, then social interactions will regulate more workers to perform outside colony tasks to optimize its investment.
It has been shown that the efficient organization of work in eusocial insects has attributed greatly in their outstanding ecological success [92] . A prominent pattern of colony organization is division of labor, expressed not only between reproductive and worker castes, but also among workers that specialize on different tasks [132, 59, 139] . Non-reproductive division of labor, or polyethism, is thought to enhance colony performance and ultimately fitness [92, 19] however see [30] . Colonies must balance the putative benefits of task specialization with the flexibility to reallocate workers in response to changes in task demand, which depends on variable internal and external factors [12, 46, 110, 57] . The study present in this paper elucidates how individual task decisions are integrated with a fundamental colony attribute (colony size) and a simple behavior rule (local social interaction) by using the framework of our proposed models.
It would be interesting to include inactive workers (i.e., workers don't appear to do anything at all) as an additional component in our models. The presence of inactive workers in social insect colonies is an another phenomenon in social insect task allocation even in the field [62, 18] , which may be driven in part by selfish interests, selfishness can at most explain a small fraction of observed inactivity [63] . The recent work shows that nor do all inactive workers appear to be reserves for defense [64] or for the case of worker loss [99] . The work of Pinter-Wollman et al. [99] suggests that inactivity may be a side-effect of an imperfect mechanism for generating individual variation for the purpose of effective task allocation, which is a mathematically difficult problem [21] . We have an on-going project to investigate potential mechanisms producing inactive workers in a separate paper.
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